When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties
Tóm tắt
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Abbott, F. M. (2000). NAFTA and the legalization of world politics: a case study. International Organization, 54, 519–547.
Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and soft law in international governance. International Organization, 54(3), 421–456.
Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., & Volosovych, V. (2007). Capital flows in a globalized world: The role of policies and institutions. In E. Sebastian (Ed.), Capital controls and capital flows in emerging economies: Policies, practices, and consequences (pp. 19–71). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alfaro, L., Kalemli-Ozcan, S., & Volosovych, V. (2008). Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor countries? An empirical investigation. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), 347–368.
Allee, T., & Peinhardt, C. (2008). Not the least BIT rational: An empirical test of the ‘rational design’ of investment treaties. In Conference on the political economy of international organizations. Monte Verità, Switzerland.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equation. Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277–297.
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at instrumental variable estimation of error-component models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1), 29–51.
Barro, R., & Lee, J.-W. (2000). International data on educational attainment: Updates and implications. CID Working Paper No. 42.
Blonigen, B. (2005). A review of the empirical literature on FDI determinants. Atlantic Economic Journal, 33(4), 383–403.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115–143.
Bubb, R., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2007). BITs and bargains: strategic aspects of bilateral and multilateral regulation of foreign investment. International Review of Law and Economics, 27(3), 291–311.
Büthe, T., & Milner, H. (2008). The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: increasing FDI through trade agreements? American Journal of Political Science, 52(4), 741–762.
Büthe, T., & Milner, H. V. (2009). Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment: A political analysis. In K. P. Sauvant & L. E. Sachs (Eds.), The effect of treaties on foreign direct investment: Bilateral investment treaties, double taxation treaties, and investment flows (pp. 171–224). New York: Oxford University Press.
Chakrabarti, A. (2001). The determinants of foreign direct investments: sensitivity analyses of cross-country regressions. Kyklos, 54(1), 89–114.
Choi, S.-W., & Samy, Y. (2006). Puzzling through: The impact of regime type on inflows of foreign direct investment. In Unpublished Manuscript.
Dolzer, R., & Stevens, M. (1995). Bilateral investment treaties. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Dunning, J. H. (2001). The Eclectic (OLI) paradigm of international production: past, present and future. International Journal of Economics and Business, 8(2), 173–190.
Eichengreen, B., & Irwin, D. (1995). Trade blocs, currency blocs, and the reorientation of trade in the 1930s. Journal of International Economics, 38, 1–24.
Eichengreen, B., & Irwin, D. (1997). The role of history in bilateral trade flows. In J. Frankel (Ed.), The regionalization of the world economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Elkins, Z., Guzman, A., & Simmons, B. (2006). Competing for capital: the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960–2000. International Organization, 60, 811–846.
Franzese, R., & Kam, C. (2007). Modeling and interpreting interactive hypotheses in regression analysis: A brief refresher and some practical advice. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Ginsburg, T. (2005). International substitutes for domestic institutions: bilateral investment treaties and governance. International Review of Law and Economics, 25, 107–123.
Goldsmith, A. (1995). Democracy, property rights and economic growth. Journal of Development Studies, 32(2), 157–175.
Grabowski, R., & Shields, M. (1989). Lewis and Ricardo: a reinterpretation. World Development, 17(2), 193–198.
Granger, C., & Newbold, P. (1974). Spurious regressions in econometrics. Journal of Econometrics, 2, 111–120.
Guzmán, A. (1998). Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: explaining the popularity of bilateral investment treaties. Virginia Journal of International Law, 38, 639–688.
Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Montgomery, A. H. (2008). Power or plenty: how do international trade institutions affect economic sanctions? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(2), 213–242.
Hafner-Burton, E. M., von Stein, J., & Gartzke, E. (2008). International organizations count. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(2), 175–188.
Hallward-Driemeier, M. (2003). Do bilateral investment treaties attract FDI? Only a bit...and they could bite. In World bank policy research working paper. Washington: World Bank.
Hansen, L. (1982). Large sample properties of generalised method of moments estimators. Econometrica, 50, 1029–1054.
Henisz, W. (2000). The institutional environment for multinational investment. Journal Of Law Economics & Organization, 16(2), 334–364.
Jakobsen, J., & de Soysa, I. (2006). Do foreign investors punish democracy? Theory and empirics, 1984–2001. Kyklos, 59(3), 383–410.
Jensen, N. (2003). Democratic governance and multinational corporations: political regimes and inflows of foreign direct investment. International Organization, 57(3), 587–616.
Jensen, N. (2006). Nation-states and the multinational corporation: Political economy of foreign direct investment. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Jun, K., & Singh, H. (1996). The determinants of foreign direct investment in developing countries. Transnational Corporations, 5(2), 67–105.
Keefer, P. (1999). When do special interests run rampant? Disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and, checks and balances in banking crises. In The world bank, policy research working paper series. Washington: World Bank.
Kerner, A. (2009). Why should i believe you? The costs and consequences of bilateral investment treaties. International Studies Quarterly, 53(1), 73–102.
Kosack, S., & Tobin, J. (2006). Funding self-sustaining development: the role of aid, FDI and government in economic success. International Organization, 60(1), 205–243.
Leblang, D. (1996). Property rights, democracy and economic growth. Political Research Quarterly, 49(1), 5–27.
Levy Yeyati, E., Panizza, U., & Stein, E. (2007). The cyclical nature of north-south FDI flows. Journal of International Money and Finance, 26(1), 104–130.
Li, Q., & Resnick, A. (2003). Reversal of fortunes: democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries. International Organization, 57(1), 175–211.
Manger, M. S. (2009). Investing in protection: The politics of preferential trade agreements between North and South. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mansfield, E. D., & Pevehouse, J. C. (2008). Democratization and the varieties of international organizations. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(2), 269–294.
Marshall, M., & Jaggers, K. (2008). Polity IV project. University of Maryland. Available from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ .
Martin, L. L. (2000). Democratic commitments: Legislatures and international cooperation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Montt, S. (2009). State liability in investment treaty arbitration: Global constitutionalism and administrative law in the BIT generation. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Neumayer, E., & Spess, L. (2005). Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries? World Development, 33(10), 1567–1585.
Noorbakhsh, F., Paloni, A., & Youssef, A. (2001). Human capital and FDI inflows to developing countries: new empirical evidence. World Development, 29(9), 1593–1610.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peinhardt, C., & Allee, T. (2010). Devil in the details: The investment effects of dispute settlement variation in BITs. Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the International Political Economy Society. Palo Alto, CA.
Roodman, D. (2009). How to xtabond2: an introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata. The Stata Journal, 9(1), 86–136.
Root, F., & Ahmed, A. (1979). Empirical determinants of manufacturing direct foreign investment in developing countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 27, 751–767.
Rugman, A. (1980). Internalization as a general theory of foreign direct investment: a re-appraisal of the literature. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 116(2), 365–379.
Salacuse, J., & Sullivan, N. (2004). Do BITs really work? An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and their grand bargain. Harvard International Law Journal, 46(1), 67–130.
Sargan, J. D. (1958). The estimation of economic relationships using instrumental variables. Econometrica, 26, 393–415.
Schneider, F., & Frey, B. (1985). Economic and political determinants of foreign direct investment. World Development, 13, 161–175.
Simmons, B. (2000). International law and state behavior: commitment and compliance in international monetary affairs. American Political Science Review, 94(4), 819–835.
Stock, J., & Watson, M. (1988). Variable trends in economic time series. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(3), 147–174.
Tobin, J. (2008). Interest groups, political investments and property rights enforcement in developing countries. Ph.D. dissertation. Yale University.
Tobin, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Foreign direct investment and the business environment in developing countries: The impact of bilateral investment treaties. In Yale law & economics research papers. New Haven.
UNCTAD. (1999). UNCTAD hosts bilateral investment treaty negotiations by group of fifteen countries. Geneva.
UNCTAD. (2001). Bilateral investment treaties 1959–1999. Geneva: United Nations.
UNCTAD. (2003). World investment report 2003. New York: United Nations.
UNCTAD. (2006). Developments in international investment agreements in 2005. In IIA monitor. Geneva.
UNCTAD. (2007). Investment instruments online. UNCTAD.
Wawro, G. (2002). Estimating dynamic panel models in political science. Political Analysis, 10, 25–48.
Wei, S.-J. (2000). How taxing is corruption on international investors? The Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(1), 1–11.
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48(4), 817–838.
Wooldridge, J. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press.
World Bank. (2005). World development report 2005: A better investment climate for everyone. Washington: The World Bank.
Yackee, J. (2008). Conceptual difficulties in the empirical study of bilateral investment treaties. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 33(2), 405–462.