Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election

John J. Bartholdi1, Craig A. Tovey1, Michael A. Trick1
1School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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