Voluntary versus enforced tax compliance: empirical evidence for the “slippery slope” framework

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 32 Số 1 - Trang 89-97 - 2011
Stephan Muehlbacher1, Erich Kirchler1, Herbert Schwarzenberger1
1Faculty of Psychology, University of Vienna, Universitaetsstrasse 7, 1010, Vienna, Wien, Austria

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