Venture‐Capital Syndication: Improved Venture Selection vs. The Value‐Added Hypothesis

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy - Tập 11 Số 3 - Trang 423-452 - 2002
James A. Brander1, Raphael Amit2, Werner Antweiler3
1University of British Columbia Vancouver, EC V6T 1Z2, Canada. [email protected]
2University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104
3University of British Columbia Vancouver, EC V6T 1Z2, Canada

Tóm tắt

Syndication arises when venture capitalists jointly invest in projects. We model and test two possible reasons for syndication: project selection, as an additional venture capitalist provides an informative second opinion; and complementary management skills of additional venture capitalists. The central question is whether venture capitalists are engaged primarily in selection or in managerial value added. These alternatives imply contrasting predictions about comparative returns to syndicated and standalone investments. Our empirical analysis, using Canadian data, finds that syndicated investments have higher returns, favoring the value‐added interpretation. We also discuss risk sharing and project scale as possible reasons for syndication.

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