Value allocation under ambiguity
Tóm tắt
We consider a pure exchange economy with asymmetric information where individual behavior exhibits ambiguity aversion along the line of maximin expected utility decision making. For such economies, we introduce different notions of maximin value allocations. We also introduce a strong notion of incentive compatibility. We prove the existence and incentive compatibility of the maximin value allocation. We conclude that unlike the Bayesian value allocation approach in Krasa Yannelis (Econometrica 62(4):881–900, 1994), incentive compatibility is related to efficiency rather than to direct exchange of information.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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