Unbundling For-Profit Higher Education: Relaxing the 90/10 Revenue Constraint

Eastern Economic Journal - Tập 49 - Trang 176-200 - 2023
Zachary G. Davis1
1Alex G. McKenna School of Business, Economics, and Government, Saint Vincent College, Latrobe, USA

Tóm tắt

In 2008, congress passed the Higher Education Opportunity Act. This act relaxed the 90/10 rule requiring for-profit institutions to earn at least 10 percent of their revenue from non-Title IV funds by revoking eligibility after 2 years of non-compliance instead of 1 year. To comply with the 90/10 rule, for-profit institutions bundle campuses together. Unbundling the campuses doubles the number of 1-year violations though the number of 2-year violations remains the same. For-profit institutions receive almost one billion dollars, or about 4.5 percent, more federal aid under the 2-year violation rule than the 1-year violation rule.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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