Two characterizations of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core on NTU games

Unternehmensforschung - Tập 64 - Trang 557-568 - 2006
Yan-An Hwang1
1Department of Applied Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan

Tóm tắt

In this paper, we provide two characterizations in the context of NTU games: of the consistent egalitarian solution and of the core. The first characterization is based on reduced games and contraction and expansion independence. The second one is based on reduced games and sub-reduced games.

Từ khóa


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