Trust in government and its effect on preferences for income redistribution and perceived tax burden

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 15 - Trang 71-100 - 2013
Eiji Yamamura1
1Seinan Gakuin University, Nishijin, Japan

Tóm tắt

This paper explores how trust in government shared by neighbors is associated with individual preferences for income redistribution and individual perceptions regarding income tax burden. Using individual-level data from Japan, a nation with shared homogenous racial and cultural backgrounds, this paper controls for unobservable heterogeneity among Japan’s population, thus reducing estimation bias. Three measures for trust in government are used: “trust in ministries and government agencies”, “trust in diet members”, and “trust in members of municipal councils”. After controlling for individual characteristics, the key findings are: (1) people are more likely to express preferences for income redistribution when trust in government in their residential area is high; (2) people are more likely to perceive their tax burden as low when trust in government in their residential area is high; and (3) when the sample is divided into people with above average income and those with below average income, these results are only clearly observed for people with above average income and not those with below average income.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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