Toward a theory of public enterprise

Marshall Goldman,The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1972.

Bengt Holmstrom, “Moral Hazard and Observability,”Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1979, pp. 74–91.

William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “The Private Enforcement of Law,”Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 4(1), January 1975, pp. 1–45.

M. Pauly, “The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment,”American Economic Review, Vol. 57, June 1968, pp. 531–36.

_____, “Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, 1974, pp. 44–62.

D. R. Pescatrice and J. M. Trapani, “The Performance and Objectives of Public and Private Utilities Operating in the United States,”Journal of Public Economics, 13, 1980, pp. 259–76.

A. Mitchell Polinsky, “Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines,”Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 9, January 1980, pp. 105–27.

Stephen A. Ross, “The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problems,”American Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 2, May 1973, pp. 134–39.

S. Shavell, “Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship,”Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 10, Spring 1979, pp. 55–73.

_____, “On Moral Hazard and Insurance,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1979, pp. 541–62.

Adam Smith,The Wealth of Nations, 1776, The Modern Library, New York, 1937.

A. M. Spence and R. Zeckhauser, “Insurance, Information, and Individual Action,”American Economic Review, 61, 1971, pp. 380–87.

J. E. Stiglitz, “Incentives and Risk Sharing in Share-cropping,”Review of Economic Studies, 61, 1974, pp. 219–56.

R. M. Titmuss,The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, New York: Pantheon Books, 1971.