Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies

Journal of Financial Intermediation - Tập 16 Số 1 - Trang 1-31 - 2007
Viral V. Acharya1,2, Tanju Yorulmazer3
1Centre for Economic Policy Research, CEPR, 90-98 Goswell Road, London EC1V 7RR, UK
2Department of Finance, London Business School, Regent's Park, London, NW1 4SA, UK
3Systemic Risk Reduction Division, Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH, UK

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