To be or not to be: Charles Beitz on the Philosophy of Human Rights

Res Publica - Tập 16 - Trang 441-448 - 2010
Adam Daniel Etinson1
1New College, Oxford, UK

Tài liệu tham khảo

Beitz, Charles. 1979/1991. Political theory and international relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Buchanan, Allen. 2004. Justice, legitimacy, and self-determination: The moral foundations of international law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, Joshua. 2008. Minimalism about human rights: The most we can hope for? The Journal of Political Philosophy 12: 190–213. Griffin, James. 2008. On human rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nickel, James. 2001. Making sense of human rights, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, Martha. 1997. Human rights theory: Capabilities and human rights. Fordham Law Review 66: 273–300. Rawls, John. 1999. The law of peoples. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Raz, Joseph. 2010. Human rights without foundations. In The philosophy of international law, eds. John Tasioulas and Samantha Besson. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tasioulas, John. 2007. The moral reality of human rights. In Freedom from poverty as a human right: Who owes what to the very poor?, ed. Thomas Pogge, 75–101. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1999. Conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights. In The East Asian challenge to human rights, ed. R.Bauer Joanne, and Daniel A. Bell, 124–147. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Walzer, Michael. 1994. Thick and thin: Moral argument at home and abroad. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.