The value of rents and the likelihood of conflicts
Tóm tắt
This paper extends the prey–predator model of Grossman and Kim (J Political Econ 103:1275–1288, 1995) to analyze the relation between the value of a contested rent and the emergence of conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes a conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That is when his valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compared to that of the prey.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Baker MJ (2003) An equilibrium conflict model of land tenure in hunter–gatherer societies. J Political Econ 111:124–173
Caselli F, Coleman J (2006) On the theory of ethnic conflict, NBER WP 12125
Collier P, Hoeffler A (2004) Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxf Econ Pap 56:663–695
Glick R, Taylor AM (2005) Collateral damage: trade disruption and the economic impact of war. Working Paper
Grossman HI, Kim M (1995) Swords or plowshares? A theory of the security of claims to property. J Political Econ 103:1275–1288
Konrad K (2002) Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages. Eur Econ Rev 46:1521–1537
Mansfield ED, Bronson R (1997) Alliances, preferential trading arrangements, and international trade. Am Political Sci Rev 91:94–107
Meland F, Straume OR (2005) Outsourcing in contests. Mimeo
Pollins B (1989a) Conflict, cooperation, and commerce: the effect of international political interactions on bilateral trade flows. Am J Political Sci 33:737–761
Pollins B (1989b) Does trade still follow the flag? Am Political Sci Rev 83:465–480
Sachs J, Warner AM (1997) Natural resource abundance and economic growth. Harvard University, Mimeo
Sachs J, Warner AM (2001) The curse of natural resources. Eur Econ Rev 45:827–838
Skaperdas S, Syropoulos C (1996) Competitive trade with conflict. In: Garfinkel MR, Skaperdas S (eds) The political economy of conflict and appropriation. Cambridge University Press, New York
Skaperdas S, Syropoulos C (2001) Guns, butter, and openness: on the relationship between security and trade. Am Econ Rev Pap Proc 91:353–357
Stein WE (2002) Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants. Public Choice 113:325–336
Van Bergeijk PV (1994) Economic diplomacy, trade, and commercial policy: positive and negative sanctions in a New World Order. Edward Elgar, Vermont