The toiling lily: narrative life, responsibility, and the ontological ground of self-deception
Tóm tắt
In this essay, I argue that genuine responsibility and ethical self-understanding are possible without narrative—or, at least, that narrative is not always sufficient. In §2, I introduce and clarify a distinction between our ontological subjectivity and everyday practical identity—one made famous by Heidegger and Sartre. On the basis of this distinction, in §3 I argue that narrative is unable to ground ethical choice and decision. For, although acting in light of practical identities is something we do, it cannot wholly capture what it is to be who we are. Irrespective of whatever worldly projects and identities we press into, something about our subjectivity always remains unchanged. Narrative identity, which trades merely on practical identity, thus obscures this ontological dimension of life wherein human action, decision, choice, and responsibility truly originate. By way of conclusion, in §4, I briefly examine depictions of the narrative life found within the authorships of Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, and Voltaire, illustrating how self-narrative at times invites self-deception and annuls responsibility. A life of genuine responsibility demands more than what the most candid and best intentioned of self-narratives can supply us. Living the good life, I shall intimate, is thus not something that involves mere narrative. It depends, rather, on inwardness.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Carr, D. (1991). Time, history, and narrative. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Crowell, S. (2004). Authentic historicality. In D. Carr & C.-F. Cheung (Eds.), Space, time, and culture. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Davenport, J. (2012). Narrative identity, autonomy, and mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard. New York: Routledge.
DeLay, S. (forthcoming). A Review of John J. Davenport’s narrative identity, autonomy, and mortality: from Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard. European Journal of Philosophy.
Derrida, J. (1995). The gift of death (trans: Willis, D.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dostoevsky, F. (1992). Crime and punishment (trans: Pevear, R., & Volokhonsky, L.). New York: Vintage Classics.
Fisher, T. (2010). Heidegger and the narrativity debate. Continental Philosophy Review, 43, 241–265.
Frank, J. (2010). Dostoevsky: A writer in his time. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Guignon, C. (1993). Authenticity, moral values, and psychotherapy. In C. Guignon (Ed.), Cambridge companion to Heidegger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1982). The basic problems of phenomenology (trans: Hofstadter, A.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1993). What is metaphysics? In D. Krell (Ed.), Basic writings. New York: Harper & Row.
Jones, M. (2005). Dostoevsky and the dynamics of religious experience. London: Anthem Press.
Kierkegaard, S. (1983). Fear and trembling (trans: Hong, E., & Hong, H.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ricoeur, P. (1980). Narrative time. In W. J. T. Mitchell (Ed.), On narrative (pp. 69–190). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rudd, A. (2009). In defence of narrative. European Journal of Philosophy, 17, 60–75.
Rudd, A. (2013). Self, value, and narrative: A Kierkegaardian approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sartre, J. (1956). Being and nothingness: A phenomenological essay in ontology (trans: Barnes, H.). New York: Washington Square Press.
Strawson, G. (2004). Against narrativity. Ratio, 16, 428–452.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Voltaire. (2003). Candide (trans: Morley H.). New York: Barnes & Nobles Books.