The robustness of robust implementation

Journal of Economic Theory - Tập 146 Số 5 - Trang 2093-2104 - 2011
Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn1, Stephen Morris2
1UCLA, Department of Economics, Bunche Hall 8283, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
2Princeton University, Department of Economics, USA

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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