The modal status of the laws of nature. Tahko’s hybrid view and the kinematical/dynamical distinction
Tóm tắt
In a recent paper, Tuomas Tahko has argued for a hybrid view of the laws of nature, according to which some physical laws are metaphysically necessary, while others are metaphysically contingent. In this paper, we show that his criterion for distinguishing between these two kinds of laws — which crucially relies on the essences of natural kinds — is on its own unsatisfactory. We then propose an alternative way of drawing the metaphysically necessary/contingent distinction for laws of physics based on the central kinematical/dynamical distinction used in physical theorising, and argue that the criterion can be used to amend Tahko’s own account, but also that it can be combined with different metaphysical views about the source of necessity.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Armstrong, D. M. (1983). What is a Law of Nature?. Cambridge University Press.
Bird, A. (2007). Nature’s Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Bird, A. (2012). Are any kinds ontologically fundamental?. In Tahko, T. (Ed.) Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics (pp. 94–104). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Curiel, E. (2016). Kinematics, dynamics, and the structure of physical theory. arXiv:1603.02999.
Dretske, F. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science, 44(2):248–268.
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge University Press.
Fine, K. (1994a). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8:1–16.
Fine, K. (1994b). Senses of essence. In Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Raffman, D., & Asher, N. (Eds), Modality, morality and belief. Essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. Cambridge University Press.
Folland, G. B. (2016). A course in abstract harmonic analysis. Chapman and Hall/CRC.
Forbes, G. (1989). Languages of Possibility: An Essay in Philosophical Logic. Blackwell.
Kistler, M. (2002). The causal criterion of reality and the necessity of laws of nature. Metaphysica, 3(1):57–86.
Kistler, M. (2005). Necessary laws. In Nature’s Principles (pp. 201–227). Springer.
Kistler, M. (2020). Powers, dispositions and laws of nature. In Meincke, A. (Ed.) Dispositionalism (pp. 171–188): Springer.
Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Lange, M. (2009). Laws and lawmakers: Science, metaphysics, and the laws of nature. Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell.
Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Wiley-Blackwell.
Lowe, E. J. (2005). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Clarendon Press.
Mellor, D. H., Mellor, D., & et al. (1991). Matters of metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.
Shoemaker, S. (1980). Causality and properties. In van Inwagen, P. (Ed.) Time and Cause. D. Reidel (pp. 109–35).
Shoemaker, S. (1998). Causal and metaphysical necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(1):59–77.
Sidelle, A. (1989). Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press.
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press.
Tahko, T. E. (2015). The modal status of laws: In defence of a hybrid view. Philosophical Quarterly, 65(260):509–528.
Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7(4):667–98.
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.