The impact of penalty and subsidy mechanisms on the decisions of the government, businesses, and consumers during COVID-19 ——Tripartite evolutionary game theory analysis

Operations Research Perspectives - Tập 9 - Trang 100255 - 2022
Yuxun Zhou1, Mohammad Mafizur Rahman1, Rasheda Khanam1, Brad R. Taylor1
1School of Business, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Queensland, Australia

Tài liệu tham khảo

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