The ignorant observer

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 31 - Trang 193-232 - 2007
Thibault Gajdos1, Feriel Kandil2
1CNRS–CES, Paris Cedex 13, France
2CERC, Paris, France

Tóm tắt

We propose an extension of Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability distributions over individuals. We obtain a characterization of the observer’s preferences that, under our most restrictive conditions, is a convex combination of Harsanyi’s utilitarian and Rawls’ egalitarian criteria. This representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals’ utilities are cardinally measurable and fully comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls’ and Harsanyi’s positions.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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