The effect of outside directors’ and auditors’ incentives on managers’ ability to manage cash bonuses
Tóm tắt
This paper investigates the impact of outside directors’ and auditors’ monetary incentives on the association between discretionary accounting and managers’ cash bonuses in a two-tier system. For a sample of German stock corporations from 2005 to 2007 we expect and find that outside directors who receive compensation based on accounting income and auditors who receive high non-audit fees have the incentive to tolerate managers’ bonus-increasing accounting choices. More specifically, we show that positive discretionary accruals are more strongly associated with managers’ cash bonuses than negative discretionary accruals if outside directors receive accounting-based compensation and/or if auditors receive high non-audit fees. Our results suggest that executives’ ability to manage their cash bonuses depends on the monitoring institutions’ monetary incentives.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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