The cooperation mechanism of the formal and informal recyclers based on information sharing

Journal of Data, Information and Management - Tập 3 - Trang 209-224 - 2021
Hemei Chen1, Hongguang Ma1
1School of Economics and Management, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, Beijing, China

Tóm tắt

In recent years, as the pollution caused by Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) has become more and more serious, attention has been paid to the recycling of WEEE increasingly. There are two recycling channels in recycling market. One is the formal recycler, and the other is the informal recycler. The informal recycler will deliver the WEEE to the individual workshop with high price while violent dismantling by the individual workshop pollutes the environment. Because of the convenience and high recycling price of the informal recycler, most WEEE are recycled by the informal recycler, and the quantity of recycling by the formal recycler is few. To avoid the problem, we propose an information sharing based collaborative mechanism that the formal recycler shares the sales information to the informal recycler while the informal recycler deliver all the recycled WEEE to the formal recycler, which makes more WEEE flow to the formal recycling channel and get formal dismantling. We establish two Nash game models in both competitive and cooperative scenarios. We obtain Nash equilibrium pricing strategy, recycling quantity and profit gains in both competitive and cooperative state. Based on the results, we propose an appropriate strategy to make the two recyclers cooperate with consideration of profit maximization. the recycling prices, recycling quantities and total recycling quantities in two scenarios, competitive and cooperate scenario, are compared. In addition, we obtain a strategy that can increase the profits of the two recyclers, the recycling prices from consumers and the total quantity of WEEE recycled from the recycling market, which is a favorable situation for the two recyclers, consumers and social environmental protection.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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