Hệ quả của các hoạt động chống độc quyền của Bộ Tư pháp Hoa Kỳ: Một góc nhìn vĩ mô

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 142 - Trang 409-422 - 2009
Andrew Thomas Young1, William F. Shughart2
1College of Business and Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, USA
2Department of Economics, The University of Mississippi, University, USA

Tóm tắt

Các hoạt động thực thi luật chống độc quyền của Bộ Tư pháp Hoa Kỳ có hoạt động như những "cú sốc công nghệ" bên ngoài hay như "cú sốc đánh dấu" hạn chế quyền lực thị trường và thúc đẩy tăng trưởng kinh tế? Chúng tôi phân tích dữ liệu chuỗi thời gian hàng năm từ năm 1947 đến 2003 về ba biện pháp can thiệp chống độc quyền của liên bang: tỷ lệ chi tiêu ngân sách của Bộ phận chống độc quyền so với GDP cũng như số lượng các vụ kiện dân sự và hình sự về chống độc quyền được khởi xướng. Chúng tôi phát hiện rằng sự thay đổi trong các mức độ của các biến chính sách này hoạt động giống như những cú sốc công nghệ tiêu cực và rằng các tác động tiêu cực này là tạm thời; chính sách chống độc quyền không tạo ra bất kỳ sự gia tăng bù đắp nào cho năng suất trong tương lai.

Từ khóa

#đối kháng độc quyền #chính sách kinh tế #cú sốc công nghệ #năng suất #tăng trưởng kinh tế

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