The concert queueing game: to wait or to be late

Rahul Jain1, Sandeep Juneja2, Nahum Shimkin3
1EE & ISE Departments, Viterbi School of Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA
2School of Technology and Computer Science, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
3Department of Electrical Engineering, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel

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