The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government

American Economic Review - Tập 94 Số 4 - Trang 1034-1054 - 2004
Eric Maskin1, Jean Tirole2
1Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 08540, and Princeton University.
2Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Manufacture des Tabacs, Bureau MF529-Bat. F, 21 allees de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France, and GREMAQ (UMR 5603 CNRS), Toulouse, CERAS (URA 2036 CNRS), Paris, and MIT.

Tóm tắt

We build a simple model to capture the major virtues and drawbacks of making public officials accountable (i.e., subjecting them to reelection): On the one hand, accountability allows the public to screen and discipline their officials; on the other, it may induce those officials to pander to public opinion and put too little weight on minority welfare. We study when decision-making powers should be allocated to the public directly (direct democracy), to accountable officials (called “politicians”), or to nonaccountable officials (called “judges”).

Từ khóa


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Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

American Economic Review

Tập 94 Số 4

1034-1054

Thông tin tác giả