The Levels of Scientific Disciplines

Samuel Z. Elgin1
1UC San Diego, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, USA

Tóm tắt

AbstractI develop an account of disciplinary level in terms of truth-maker semantics. In particular, I exploit the mereological structure of states of affairs—which is central to the truth-maker approach—to provide conditions in which one discipline occupies a higher level than another.

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