The Levels of Scientific Disciplines

Samuel Z. Elgin1
1UC San Diego, University of California San Diego, La Jolla, USA

Tóm tắt

Abstract

I develop an account of disciplinary level in terms of truth-maker semantics. In particular, I exploit the mereological structure of states of affairs—which is central to the truth-maker approach—to provide conditions in which one discipline occupies a higher level than another.

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