The Interchangeability of Perspectives Between the Victim and the Offender as an Element of Punishment
Tóm tắt
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the theory of changes in perspectives allows a different presentation of the problems which arise from a loss of recognition as an element of punishment, particularly in reference to others, the entire structure of the interaction is changed. Communicative conditions of moral discourses assume that every participant of the argumentation process takes place in all spheres of social life and can assume the perspective common to all other participants. The main task of criminal law is, then, the protection of elementary aspects of one’s role as a participant of interaction without which the chain of mutual recognition and understanding could be freely and at any moment infringed by any given participant of interactions, i.e. the protection of such rights.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Alexy, Robert. 1989. On necessary relations between law and morality, Ratio Luris 2(2): 167–183.
Apel, Karl-Otto. 1997. Diskurs und Verantwortung Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen Moral, 205–206. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Beccaria, Cesare. 1959. O przestępstwach i karach [On crimes and punishments], 88. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Prawnicze.
Coleman, Jules L. 1989. On the relationship between law and morality. Ratio Juris 1(2): 66–78.
Duff, Anthony R. 2001. Punishment, communication and community, 80ff. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Durkheim, Émile. 1997. The division of labor in society, vol. VI. New York: The Free Press.
Feinberg, Joel. 1970. Doing and deserving, 98. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Garland, David. 1990. Punishment and modern society. A study in social theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Günther, Klaus. 1991. Möglichkeiten einer diskursethischen Begründung des Strafrechts. In Recht und Moral. Beiträge zu einer Standortbestimmung, ed. Jung, Heike. Müller-Dietz, Heinz. Neumann, Ulfrid. Baden–Baden: Nomos Verlag, 210.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. The theory of communicative action vol. 2 lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason. Boston: Beacon Press 74.
Hart, Herbert L.A. 1964. Law, liberty and morality, 153. London: Oxford University Press.
Hart, Herbert L.A. 1968. Punishment and responsibility. Essays in the philosophy of law, 231. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hassemer, Winfried. 2000. Strafen im Rechtsstaat, 269ff. Baden–Baden: Nomos Verlag.
Hörnle, Tatjana. von Hirsch, Andrew. 1998. Positive Generalprävention und Tadel. In Positive Generalprävention. Kritische Analysen im deutsch-englischen Dialog, ed. Schünemann, Bernd. von Hirsch, Andrew. Jareborg, Nils. Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 93.
Kant, Immanuel. 1887. The philosophy of law: An exposition of the fundamental principles of jurisprudence as the science of right. Edinburgh: Clark, 195, 198.
Kaufmann, Arthur. 1978. Strafrechtspraxis und sittliche Normen, Juristiche Schulung: 6, 361ff.
Mead, George Herbert. 1967. Mind, self, and society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Mill, John Stuart. 1909. On Liberty, Harvard Classics, vol. 25, Chapter 1.
Papageorgiou, Konstantinos. 2000. Verantwortung, Gerechtigkeit, Sicherheit, Freiheit. Ein Plädoyer für die normative Autonomie und wider die ideale Theorie des Strafrechts, In Verantwortung in Recht und Moral, ed. Neumann, Ulfrid. Schulz, Lorenz. Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 98.
Rawls, John. 1996. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1991. Objectivity, relativity and truth. Philosophical papers, vol. I, 94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schütz, Alfred, and Thomas Luckmann. 1974. The structures of the life-world, 4ff. London: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.
Singer, Beth J. 1999. Pragmatism, rights and democracy, 34. New York: Fordham University Press.
Strawson, Peter F. 1974. Freedom and resentment and other essays, 1ff. London: Methuen & Co.
Tugendhat, Ernst. 1979. Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung, 245ff. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.