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Tác động của sự không chắc chắn đến hành vi gửi tiền: Bằng chứng từ Chương trình giao dịch quyền phát thải sulfur dioxide của Hoa Kỳ
Tóm tắt
Trong bài báo này, chúng tôi nghiên cứu một cách thực nghiệm xem sự không chắc chắn có ảnh hưởng đến giao dịch trong thị trường quyền phát thải sulfur dioxide của Hoa Kỳ hay không. Cụ thể, chúng tôi điều tra vai trò của sự không chắc chắn đối với hành vi gửi tiền. Để thực hiện điều này, chúng tôi giới thiệu một mô hình cấu trúc có thể xử lý được về giao dịch giấy phép dưới sự không chắc chắn. Mô hình thiết lập một mối quan hệ giữa hành vi gửi tiền và sở thích rủi ro, đặc biệt là sự thận trọng theo nghĩa của Kimball (1990). Chúng tôi sau đó thử nghiệm mô hình này bằng cách sử dụng dữ liệu về giấy phép, cho các tiện ích đã nộp cho Chương trình Mưa Axit của Cơ quan Bảo vệ Môi trường Hoa Kỳ, được chuyển từ năm này sang năm khác. Có bằng chứng về sự không thận trọng, cụ thể là, các tiện ích gửi giấy phép để ưu tiên lợi nhuận cao hơn. Một phát hiện khác là các tiện ích lớn hơn không áp dụng hành vi khác biệt đáng kể so với các tiện ích nhỏ hơn.
Từ khóa
#sự không chắc chắn #quyền phát thải sulfur dioxide #hành vi gửi tiền #mô hình cấu trúc #sở thích rủi ro #thận trọngTài liệu tham khảo
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