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Tác Động của Bảo Hiểm Bổ Sung Medicare đến Chi Phí Medicare
Tóm tắt
Nghiên cứu này ước lượng tác động của các kế hoạch bảo hiểm bổ sung Medicare đến chi phí Medicare, kiểm soát cho sự lựa chọn không quan sát được. Đối với các chính sách do nhà tuyển dụng tài trợ, có sự lựa chọn không quan sát được theo chiều hướng thuận lợi đáng kể vào các kế hoạch có và không có bảo hiểm thuốc theo toa. Đối với các kế hoạch cá nhân, có sự lựa chọn không quan sát được theo chiều hướng bất lợi vào các kế hoạch có lợi ích thuốc và sự lựa chọn không quan sát được theo chiều hướng thuận lợi vào các kế hoạch không có. Các kế hoạch bổ sung cá nhân không có thuốc theo toa đã làm tăng chi phí Medicare thêm 914 đô la mỗi năm, trong khi đó các kế hoạch có thuốc đã làm tăng chi phí Medicare thêm 491 đô la. Các chính sách của nhà tuyển dụng cũng đã làm tăng chi phí Medicare một cách đáng kể (207 đô la không có bảo hiểm thuốc và 447 đô la có bảo hiểm thuốc), nhưng mức tăng này thấp hơn so với mức tăng liên quan đến các chính sách cá nhân.
Từ khóa
#Bảo hiểm bổ sung Medicare #chi phí Medicare #lựa chọn không quan sát được #bảo hiểm thuốc theo toaTài liệu tham khảo
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