The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law

Journal of Economic Literature - Tập 38 Số 1 - Trang 45-76 - 2000
Maria Polinsky1, Steven Shavell2
1Stanford Law School and National Bureau of Economic Research.
2Harvard Law School and National Bureau of Economic Research.

Tóm tắt

This article surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of public agents (inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. We first present the basic elements of the theory, focusing on the probability of imposition of sanctions, the magnitude and form of sanctions, and the rule of liability. We then examine a variety of extensions of the central theory, concerning accidental harms, costs of imposing fines, errors, general enforcement, marginal deterrence, the principal-agent relationship, settlements, self-reporting, repeat offenders, imperfect knowledge about the probability and magnitude of fines, and incapacitation.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

10.2307/3310845

10.2307/2601054

Andreoni Brian Erard, 1998, J. Econ. Lit., 36, 818

10.1086/467947

10.1086/467910

10.1016/0144-8188(93)90007-R

10.1086/259394

10.1086/467507

Block Michael K, 1980, Georgetown Law J., 68, 1131

10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00056-7

10.1086/467501

Clotfelter Charles T, 1977, Amer. Econ. Rev., 67, 867

10.1016/0094-1190(78)90018-9

Cohen Mark A, 1989, Amer. Criminal Law Rev., 26, 605

Cooter Robert D, 1989, J. Econ. Lit., 27, 1067

Craswell Richard, 1986, J. Law Econ. Organ., 2, 279

10.2307/20080247

10.1086/468012

Ehrlich Isaac, 1981, Amer. Econ. Rev., 71, 307

Friedman David D, 1981, Res. Law Econ., 3, 185

Friedman David D, 1995, U. Chicago Law School Roundtable, 2, 475

10.1111/1467-6419.00034

Grossman Gene M, 1983, Amer. Econ. Rev., 73, 749

Kaplow Louis, 1990, J. Law Econ. Organ., 6, 93

10.1016/0047-2727(90)90015-A

10.1016/0144-8188(92)90002-9

10.1086/467304

10.1086/261947

10.1016/0167-6296(93)90024-9

10.1086/467428

10.1016/0144-8188(92)90006-D

10.2307/3480271

10.1086/466704

10.1086/467524

10.2307/2946681

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01720.x

10.1016/0144-8188(90)90014-K

10.2307/1290070

10.2307/2555613

10.1006/jeem.1993.1016

10.1007/BF00709142

Mookherjee Dilip, 1992, Amer. Econ. Rev., 82, 556

10.1086/261963

10.2307/2235324

10.1016/0144-8188(90)90010-Q

10.1016/0144-8188(86)90042-6

10.1086/467630

Polinsky A. Mitchell., 1980, Amer. Econ. Rev.: Papers and Proceedings, 70, 363

10.1016/0144-8188(88)90019-1

Polinsky A. Mitchell, 1989, Res. Law Econ., 12, 1

10.1016/0047-2727(91)90009-Q

Polinsky A. Mitchell, 1979, Amer. Econ. Rev., 69, 880

10.1016/0047-2727(84)90006-9

Polinsky A. Mitchell, 1991, Amer. Econ. Rev., 81, 618

10.1086/467247

10.1016/0144-8188(93)90035-4

10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00009-X

10.1086/468044

Posner Richard A, 1980, Amer. Criminal Law Rev., 17, 409

10.1086/467628

10.2307/1122392

Posner Richard A, 1997, Amer. Econ. Rev.: Papers and Proceedings, 87, 365

Reinganum Jennifer F, 1988, Amer. Econ. Rev., 78, 713

Rubinstein Ariel, 1979, Applied Game Theory. S. J. Brams, A. Schotter, and G. Schwödiauer, eds. Wurzburg: Physica-Verlag, 406

10.1086/261800

10.1016/0095-0696(92)90028-U

10.1086/467626

10.2307/3003434

10.2307/1122393

Shavell Steven, 1987, Amer. Econ. Rev.: Papers and Proceedings, 77, 107

Shavell Steven, 1987, Amer. Econ. Rev., 77, 584

10.1016/0144-8188(91)90014-5

10.1086/261790

10.1016/0144-8188(92)90013-H

10.1086/467275

10.1086/468008

10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00003-3

10.1086/468009

10.1086/259646

10.2307/795853

University of Pennsylvania Law Review., 1996, U. Pennsylvania Law Rev., 144, 1643, 10.2307/3312636

10.1016/0144-8188(92)90012-G

Thông tin
Thông tin xuất bản

Journal of Economic Literature

Tập 38 Số 1

45-76

Thông tin tác giả