The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

Acemoglu, D., Yildiz, M.: Evolution of perceptions and play. mimeo, MIT 2001

Alchian A. (1950). Uncertainty, evolution and economic theory. J Polit Econ 58:211–221

Al-Najjar, N., Baliga, S., Besanko, D.: The sunk cost bias and managerial pricing policies, working paper, Northwestern University 2004

Babcock L., Loewenstein G. (1997). Explaining bargaining impasse: the role of self-serving biases. J Econ Perspect 11(1):109–126

Bar-Gill, O., Fershtman, C.: The limit of public policy: endogenous preferences, Foerder working paper 5-01, Tel Aviv University 2001

Benabou, R., Tirole, J.: Self-confidence: intrapersonal strategies, mimeo, Princeton University 1999a

Benabou, R., Tirole, J.: Self-confidence and social interactions, mimeo, Princeton University 1999b

Benos A.V. (1998). Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders. J Financ Mark 1:353–383

Bergman, N., Bergman, Y.: Ecologies of Preferences with envy as an antidote to risk-aversion in Bargaining, mimeo, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem 2000

Bester H., Güth W. (1998). Is altruism evolutionarily stable?. J Econo Behav Org 34(2):211–221

Bolle F. (2000). Is altruism evolutionarily stable? and envy and malevolence? – remarks on Bester and Güth. J Econo Behav Org 42(1):131–133

Brocas, I., Carrillo, J.: Entry mistakes, entrepreneurial boldness and optimism, CEPR D.P. 2213 1999

Bulow J., Geanakoplos J., Klemperer P. (1985). Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and complements. J Polit Econ 93(3):488–511

Camerer C. (2003). Behavioral game theory, experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton University Press, Princeton

Camerer C., Lovallo D. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: an experimental approach. Am Econ Rev 89(1):306–318

Christensen-Szalanski J.J., Bushyhead J. (1981). Physicians’ use of probabilistic information in a real clinical setting. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 7:928–935

Compte O., Postlewaite A. (2004). Confidence-enhanced performance. Am Econ Rev 94(5):1536–1557

Cooper A.C., Dunkelberg W., Woo C. (1988). Entrepreneurs’ perceived chances of success. J Bus Venturing 3:97–108

De Bondt W., Thaler R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact?. J Financ 40:793–807

Dekel E., Scotchmer S. (1999). On the evolution of attitudes toward risk in winner-take-all games. J Econo Theory 87:95–124

Dekel, E., Ely, J., Yilankaya, O.: Evolution of preferences. mimeo, Northwestern University 2005

Dufwenberg M., Güth W. (1999). Indirect evolution vs. strategic delegation: a comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions. Eur J Polit Econ 15:281–295

Ely J., Yilankaya O. (2001). Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences. J Econ Theory 97(2):255–272

Fershtman C., Heifetz A. (2006). Read my lips, watch for leaps: preference equilibrium and political instability. The Econ J 116:246–265

Fershtman C., Judd K. (1987). Incentive equilibrium in oligopoly. Am Econ Rev 77(5):927–940

Fershtman, C., Weiss, Y.: Why do we care about what others think about us?. In: Ben Ner, A., Putterman, L. (eds) Economics, values and organization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997

Fershtman C., Weiss Y. (1998). Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences. J Publ Econ 70:53–74

Frank R.H. (1987). If homo economicus could choose his own utility function, would he choose one with a conscience?. Am Econ Rev 77(4):593–604

Frank R.H. (1988). Passions within reason – the strategic role of the emotions. W.W. Norton & Company, New York

Friedman M. (1953). Essays in positive economics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Froot K., Frankel J. (1989). Forward discount bias: is it an exchange risk premium?. Q J Econ 104:139–161

Fudenberg D., Levine D. (1998). The theory of learning in games. MIT Press, Cambridge

Griffen D., Tversky A. (1992). The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence. Cognitive Psychol 24:411–435

Güth W., Peleg B. (2001). When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis. J Evol Econ 11:479–499

Güth W., Yaari M. (1992). Explaining reciprocal behavior in simple strategic games: an evolutionary approach. In: Witt U. (eds) Explaining forces and changes: approaches to evolutionary economics. University of Michigan Press, Michigan

Guthrie C., Rachlinski J., Wistrich A. (2001). Inside the judicial mind: heuristics and biases. Cornell Law Rev 86:777–830

Güth W., Ockenfels, A.: The coevolution of morality and legal institutions – an indirect evolutionary approach, mimeo 2001

Heifetz A., Segev E. (2004). The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining. Games Econ Behav 49:117–134

Heifetz, A., Segev, E., Talley, E.: Market design with endogenous preferences. Games Econ Behav (in press) 2006

Heifetz, A., Shannon, C. Spiegel, Y.: What to maximize if you must. J Econ Theory (previous version, IBER working paper, 2003) (in press) 2006

Huck S., Oechssler J. (1998). The indirect evolutionary approach to explaining fair allocations. Games Econ Behav 28:13–24

Huck S., Kirchsteiger, G., Oechssler, J.: Learning to like what you have – explaining the endowment effect. The Econo J (in press) 2006

Katz M. (1991). Game-playing agents: unobservable contracts as precommitments. Rand J Econ 22:307–328

Kidd J. (1970). The utilization of subjective probabilities in production planning. Acta Psychol 34:338–347

Koçkesen L., Ok E.A., Sethi R. (2000a). Evolution of interdependent preferences in aggregative games. Games Econ Behav 31:303–310

Koçkesen L., Ok E.A., Sethi R. (2000b). The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences. J Econ Theory 92:274–299

Kyle A.S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53:1315–1336

Kyle A.S., Wang A. (1997). Speculation duopoly with agreement to disagree: can overconfidence survive the market test? The J Financ LII:2073–2090

Milgrom P., Shannon C. (1994). Monotone comparative statics. Econometrica 62:157–180

Moulin H. (1984). Dominance solvability and cournot stability. Math Soc Sci 7(1):83–102

Myers D. (1998). Psychology, Fifth Edition. Worth Publishers Inc, New York

Oechssler J., Riedel F. (2001). Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ Theory 17:141–162

Ok E.A., Vega-Redondo F. (2001). On the evolution of individualistic preferences: an incomplete information scenario. J Econ Theory 97:231–254

Oskamp S. (1965). Overconfidence in case study judgments. J Consult Psychol 29:261–265

Possajennikov, A.: On the evolutionary stability of altruistic and spiteful preferences. J Econo Behav Org 42(1), 125–129 (preliminary version appeared as CentER working paper 9956, Tilburg University). 2000

Robson A.R. (1996a). A biological basis for expected and non-expected utility. J Econ Theory 68:397–424

Robson A.R. (1996b). The evolution of attitudes to risk: lottery tickets and relative wealth. Games Econ Behav 14:190–207

Rogers A.R. (1994). Evolution of time preference by natural selection. Am Econ Rev 84:460–481

Rosen J. (1965). Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave n-person games. Econometrica 33:520–534

Russo J., Schoemaker P. (1992). Managing overconfidence. Sloan Manag Rev 33:74–76

Samuelson L., Zhang J. (1992). Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games. J Econ Theory 57:363–391

Sandholm W. (2001). Preference evolution, two-speed dynamics, and rapid social change. Rev Econ Dynam 4:637–679

Schelling T. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

Taylor P., Jonker L. (1978). Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics. Math Biosci 40:145–156

Vega-Redondo F. (1997). The evolution of walrasian behavior. Econometrica 65:375–384

Waldman M. (1994). Systematic errors and the theory of natural selection. Am Econ Rev 84(3):482–497

Wason P.C. (1981). The importance of cognitive illusions. The Behav Brain Sci 4:356

Weibull J. (1995). Evolutionary game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge