The Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems

Journal of Industrial Economics - Tập 52 Số 1 - Trang 1-26 - 2004
Julian Wright1
1Department of Economics, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore

Tóm tắt

This paper presents a model of a card payment system as a two‐sided market that allows for partial participation by heterogeneous consumers and merchants. Taking into account the strategic effects arising from competition between merchants, the model is used to characterize the optimal structure of fees between those charged to cardholders and those charged to merchants and, more specifically, the level of the interchange fee that banks charge each other. The results modify the existing characterizations of the interchange fee, and explain the source of potential deviations between the privately and socially optimal level of the fee.

Từ khóa


Tài liệu tham khảo

10.1086/467049

10.1111/j.1745-6606.2003.tb00451.x

Chakravorti S., 2003, Underlying Incentives in Credit Card Networks, The Antitrust Bulletin

Chakravorti S.andTo T. 2000 ‘A Theory of Credit Cards ’ mimeo Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

Chang H. H., 2000, The Competitive Effects of the Collective Setting of Interchange Fees by Payment Card Systems, The Antitrust Bulletin, 45, 641, 10.1177/0003603X0004500304

10.2307/1911240

Evans D., 1999, Paying with Plastic: The Digital Revolution in Buying and Borrowing

Frankel A. S., 1998, Monopoly and Competition in the Supply and Exchange of Money, Antitrust Law Journal, 66, 313

Gans J. S., 2003, The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems, Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, 3

IMA Market Development AB 2000 ‘Study Regarding the Effect of the Abolition of the Non‐Discrimination Rule in Sweden for Europian Commission Competition Directorate General ’ February.

ITM Research 2000 ‘The Abolition of the Non‐Discrimination Rule ’ Amsterdam March.

Lyons D. 2002 ‘Visa's Vision ’Forbes Magazine September 4.

RBA. 2002 ‘Reform of Credit Card Schemes in Australia. IV. Final Reforms and Regulation Impact Statement ’ Reserve Bank of Australia public document August.

10.2307/3087474

Rochet J‐C.andTirole J. 2002b ‘Platform Competition in Two‐Sided Markets ’ mimeo December 13 IDEI and GREMAQ.

10.1111/1467-6451.00170

Schwartz M.andVincent D. 2002 ‘Same Price Cash or Card: Vertical Control by Payment Networks ’ Working Paper 02‐01 Georgetown University.

Wright J. 2000 ‘An Economic Analysis of a Card Payment Network ’ mimeo NECG and University of Auckland.

Wright J. 2001 ‘Determinants of Optimal Interchange Fees in Payment Systems ’ University of Auckland Working Paper No. 220.

10.1016/S0014-2921(02)00305-7

10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00143-5