The Complexity of Coordination

Eastern Economic Journal - Tập 43 - Trang 260-270 - 2016
Davoud Taghawi-Nejad1, Vipin P. Veetil2
1Center for Metropolitan Studies, São Paulo, Brasil
2Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, USA

Tóm tắt

The traditional mechanism of finding Nash equilibria presumes economic actors are capable of performing computations that even computers would take far too long to complete. A decentralized and parallel process of interactions between simple economic actors is presented as a more plausible microfoundation of the concept of Nash equilibria. It is found that agent interactions on a scale-free network converge to an equilibrium within reasonable time. NP computational complexity of Nash equilibria does not diminish its empirical relevance.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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