The 2010 Revised Merger Guidelines and Modern Industrial Economics
Tóm tắt
The new Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide greater transparency into how the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission staffs review horizontal mergers than did the guidelines they replaced. While they reflect some advances in economic techniques for predicting the competitive consequences of mergers (most notabley the Upward Pricing Pressure test), greater attention to costs and efficiencies could further improve merger review.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Adelman M. A. (1959) Economic aspects of the Bethlehem opinion. Virginia Law Review 45(5): 684–696
Ashenfelter, O. C., & Hosken, D. (2008). The effect of mergers on consumer prices: Evidence from five selected case studies. NBER working paper W13859.
Berry S., Levinsohn J., Pakes A. (1995) Automobile prices in market equilibrium. Econometrica 63(4): 841–890
Blumenthal W. (2010) Scope and specificity in the 2010 guidelines: A pretty good balance. Antitrust 25(1): 10–14
Bresnahan T. F. (1989) Empirical studies of industries with market power. In: Schmalensee R. L., Willig R. (eds) The handbook of industrial organization. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 1011–1057
Coate, M. B., & Ulrick, S. W. (2005). Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The horizontal merger review process 1996–2003. Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics working paper. Available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/02/0502economicissues.pdf.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. (2006). Commentary on the horizontal merger guidelines. Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. (2010). Horizontal merger guidelines. Available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
Farrell, J., & Shapiro, C. (2010). Antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers: An alternative to market definition. Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics, 10(article 9).
Harris B. C., Simons J. J. (1989) Focusing market definition: How much substitution is necessary?. Research in Law and Economics 12: 207–226
Werden G. J. (2003) The 1982 merger guidelines and the ascent of the hypothetical monopolist paradigm. Antitrust Law Review 71(1): 253–275
Werden G. J., Froeb L. M, Tschantz S. (2005) The effect of merger efficiencies on consumers of differentiated products. European Competition Journal 1(2): 245–264
Weyl, E. G., & Fabinger, M. (2009). Pass-through as an economic tool. Unpublished manuscript.