Testing subgame perfection apart from fairness in ultimatum games
Tóm tắt
We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play. We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially difficult environment for learning subgame perfection.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Abbink, K., Bolton, G., Sadrieh, A., & Tang, F. (2001). Adaptive learning versus punishment in ultimatum bargaining. Games and Economic Behavior, 37(1), 1–25.
Andreoni, J. (1995). Cooperation in public-goods experiments: Kindness or confusion? American Economic Review, 85(4), 891–904.
Andreoni, J., Castillo, M., & Petrie, R. (2003). What do bargainers’ preferences look like? Exploring a convex ultimatum game. American Economic Review, 93(3), 672–685.
Andreoni, J., Castillo, M., & Petrie, R. (2004). Revealing preferences for fairness in ultimatum bargaining: Parametric and non-parametric estimates of preferences, working paper, University of Wisconsin.
Bolton, G. (1991). A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence. American Economic Review, 81(5), 1096–1136.
Bolton, G., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review, 90(1), 166–193.
Camerer, C., & Ho, T. (1999). Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica, 67(4), 827–874.
Erev, I., & Roth, A. (1995). Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8(1), 164–212.
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). Theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868.
Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. (1997). Measuring players’ losses in experimental games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(2), 507–536.
Gale, J., Binmore, K., & Samuelson, L. (1995). Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game. Games and Economic Behavior, 8(1), 56–90.
Goeree, J., & Holt, C. (2000). Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games. European Economic Review, 44, 1079–1089.
Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(4), 367–388
Houser, D., & Kurzban, R. (2002). Revisiting kindness and confusion in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 94(4), 1062–1069.
Li, J. (2004). A model of ethical behavior, working paper. University of Wisconsin–Madison.
Ochs, J., & Roth, A. E. (1989). An experimental study of sequential bargaining. American Economic Review, 79(3), 355–384.
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281–1302.
Rabin, M., & Charness, G. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–861.
Roth, A. E., Prasnikar, V., Okunofujiwara, M., & Zamir, S. (1991). Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 81(5), 1068–1095.
Slonim, R., & Roth, A. (1998). Learning in high stakes ultimatum games: An experiment in the slovak republic. Econometrica, 66(3), 569–596.