Tax policy on foreign direct investment in the presence of cross-hauling
Tóm tắt
Tax Policy on Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Cross-Hauling. — The authors develop a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which identical foreign firms locate themselves in a host country to compete with internationally mobile domestic firms in non-tradeable oligopolistic markets for two differentiated commodities. The host country, which is small in the market for FDI, uses lumpsum subsidy (tax) to encourage (discourage) FDI. There is unemployment in the host country. Under this framework, the authors analyse the effect of discriminatory and uniform subsidies on the inflow/outflow of domestic and foreign firms and on employment. They also derive some properties of optimal subsidies.
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