THE PARADOX OF POWER*

Economics and Politics - Tập 3 Số 3 - Trang 177-200 - 1991
Jack Hirshleifer1
1Department of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USA

Tóm tắt

In power struggles, the strong might be expected to grow ever stronger and the weak weaker still. But in actuality, poorer or smaller combatants often end up improving their position relative to richer or larger ones. This is the paradox of power. The explanation is that initially poorer contenders are rationally motivated to fight harder, to invest relatively more in conflictual activity. Only when the decisiveness of conflict is sufficiently high does the richer side gain relatively in terms of achieved income. Among other things, the paradox of power explains political redistributions of income from the rich to the poor.

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Tài liệu tham khảo

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Economics and Politics

Tập 3 Số 3

177-200

Thông tin tác giả