THE EFFECT OF REWARDS AND SANCTIONS IN PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS

Economic Inquiry - Tập 45 Số 4 - Trang 671-690 - 2007
Martín Sefton1, Robert Shupp2, James M. Walker3
1Sefton: Professor, School of Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. Phone 44-115-846-6130, Fax 44-115-951-4159, E-mail [email protected]
2Shupp: Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1039. Phone 517-432-2754, Fax 517-432-1800, E-mail [email protected]
3Walker: Professor, Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405. Phone 812-855-2760, Fax 812-855-3736, E-mail [email protected]

Tóm tắt

A growing number of field and experimental studies focus on the institutional arrangements by which individuals are able to solve collective action problems. Important in this research is the role of reciprocity and institutions that facilitate cooperation via opportunities for monitoring, sanctioning, and rewarding others. Sanctions represent a cost to both the participant imposing the sanction and the individual receiving the sanction. Rewards represent a zero‐sum transfer from participants giving to those receiving rewards. We contrast reward and sanction institutions in regard to their impact on cooperation and efficiency in the context of a public goods experiment. (JEL C92)

Từ khóa


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Economic Inquiry

Tập 45 Số 4

671-690

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