THE CONTOURS OF CORPORATE MORAL AGENCY
Tóm tắt
This article defends skepticism about the moral agency of corporations, arguing that even if we accept the idea that there exist group moral agents, it makes little sense to suppose that the corporation itself can qualify as such an agent. The discussion considers and rejects arguments from Philip Pettit, Peter French, and Michael Bratman. It concludes that we should not criminally prosecute corporations.
Tài liệu tham khảo
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