Syndromic surveillance using minimum transfer of identifiable data: The example of the national bioterrorism syndromic surveillance demonstration program

Journal of Urban Health - Tập 80 - Trang i25-i31 - 2003
Richard Platt1,2, Carmella Bocchino3, Blake Caldwell4, Robert Harmon5, Ken Kleinman1, Ross Lazarus2,6, Andrew F. Nelson7, James D. Nordin7, Debra P. Ritzwoller8
1Department of Ambulatory Care and Prevention, Harvard Medical School and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Boston
2Channing Laboratory, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston
3American Association of Health Plans, Washington, DC
4Savannah
5Optum, Golden Valley
6University of Sydney, School of Public Health, Australia
7Health Partners Research Foundation, Minneapolis
8Katser Permanente Colorado, Denver

Tóm tắt

Several health plants and other organizations are collaborating with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to develop a syndromic surveillance system with national coverage that includes more than 20 million people. A principal design feature of this system is reliance on daily reporting of counts of individuals with syndromes of interest in specified geographic regions rather than reporting of individual encounter-level information. On request from public health agencies, health plans and telephone triage services provide additional information regarding individuals who are part of apparent clusters of illness. This reporting framework has several advantages, including less sharing of protected health information, less risk that confidential information will be distributed inappropriately, the prospect of better public acceptance, greater acceptance by health plans, and less effort and cost for both health plans and public health agencies. If successful, this system will allow any organization with appropriate data to contribute vital information to public health syndromic surveillance systems while preserving individuals’ privacy to the greatest extent possible.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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