Swiss DRGs: Patient Heterogeneity and Hospital Payments

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 144 - Trang 309-322 - 2008
Michel Mougeot1,2, Florence Naegelen2
1CRESE, UFR SJEPG, University of Franche-Comte, Besançon Cedex, France
2IEMS, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

Tóm tắt

In this paper, we analyze the prospective method of paying hospitals when the within-DRG variance is high. To avoid patients dumping, an outlier payment system is implemented. In the APDRG Swiss System, it consists in a mixture of fully prospective payments for low costs patients and partially cost-based system for high cost patients. We show how the optimal policy depends on the degree to which hospitals take patients’ interest into account. A fixed-price policy is optimal when the hospital is sufficiently benevolent. When the hospital is weakly benevolent, a mixed policy solving a trade-off between rent extraction, efficiency and dumping deterrence must be preferred. Following Mougeot and Naegelen (2008), we show how the optimal combination of fixed price and partially cost-based payment depends on the degree of benevolence of the hospital, the social cost of public funds and the distribution of patients severity.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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