Thành công của một chương trình ân xá thuế: Tại cuộc bầu cử, cho ngân sách nhà nước?

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 72 - Trang 131-165 - 1991
Werner W. Pommerehne1, Peter Zweifel2
1Department of Economics, Public Sector Economics, University of Saarbrucken, Saarbrucken 11
2Institute of Empirical Economic Research, University of Zurich, Zurich

Tóm tắt

Bài báo này cung cấp một mô hình để phân tích quyết định bỏ phiếu của cá nhân về chương trình ân xá thuế cũng như sự thay đổi trong hành vi khai báo của họ khi được ân xá hoặc bị từ chối. Sự thành công tại các cuộc bầu cử được dự đoán sẽ gia tăng cùng với mức hình phạt cao hơn đối với những người trốn thuế bị phát hiện, trong khi sự thành công về mặt khai báo có thể bị đe dọa. Những điều này và các hệ quả khác của mô hình sẽ được kiểm tra một cách thực nghiệm cho hai đề xuất ân xá thuế tại Thụy Sĩ, một đề xuất bị từ chối, một đề xuất được phần lớn công dân/người nộp thuế phê duyệt.

Từ khóa

#ân xá thuế #quyết định bỏ phiếu #hành vi khai báo #Thụy Sĩ #chính sách thuế

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