Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications

Journal of Economic Literature - Tập 51 Số 1 - Trang 5-62 - 2013
Vincent P. Crawford1, Miguel A. Costa‐Gomes2, Nagore Iriberri3
1University of Oxford, All Souls College, Oxford, and University of California, San Diego.
2University of St Andrews
3University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, IKERBASQUE, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

Tóm tắt

Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people's initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that structural nonequilibrium “level-k” or “cognitive hierarchy” models often out-predict equilibrium. Even when learning is possible and converges to equilibrium, such models allow better predictions of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper surveys recent theory and evidence on strategic thinking and illustrates the applications of level-k models in economics. (JEL C70, D03, D82, D83)

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Journal of Economic Literature

Tập 51 Số 1

5-62

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