Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications
Tóm tắt
Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people's initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that structural nonequilibrium “level-k” or “cognitive hierarchy” models often out-predict equilibrium. Even when learning is possible and converges to equilibrium, such models allow better predictions of history-dependent limiting outcomes. This paper surveys recent theory and evidence on strategic thinking and illustrates the applications of level-k models in economics. (JEL C70, D03, D82, D83)
Từ khóa
Tài liệu tham khảo
Chivers C. J., 2004, The New York Times, 20, A1
Ho Teck-Hua, 1998, American Economic Review, 88, 947
Kagel John H, 1986, American Economic Review, 76, 894
Morris Stephen, 1998, American Economic Review, 88, 587
Nagel Rosemarie, 1995, American Economic Review, 85, 1313
Rubinstein Ariel, 1989, American Economic Review, 79, 385
Runyon Damon, 1992, Guys and Dolls: The Stories of Damon Runyon, 14