Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped

Economics Letters - Tập 55 - Trang 339-346 - 1997
Bettina Klaus1, Hans Peters1, Ton Storcken1
1Maastricht University, Department of Quantitative Economics, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands

Tài liệu tham khảo

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