Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation

Journal of Economic Theory - Tập 213 - Trang 105712 - 2023
Priyanka Shende1, Manish Purohit2
1Amazon, Santa Clara, United States of America
2Google Research, Mountain View, United States of America

Tài liệu tham khảo

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