Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games

American Economic Review - Tập 101 Số 7 - Trang 3427-3439 - 2011
Steffen Andersen1, Seda Ertaç2, Uri Gneezy3, Moshe Hoffman4, John A. List5
1Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 16A, 1, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark.
2Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, Sariyer, Istanbul 34450, Turkey
3Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093.
4Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, CA 92093.
5Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 E. 59th St., Chicago, IL 60637, and NBER.

Tóm tắt

One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes. By using a novel experimental design that elicits frequent low offers and uses much larger stakes than in the literature, we are able to examine stakes' effects over ranges of data that are heretofore unexplored. Our main result is that proportionally equivalent offers are less likely to be rejected with high stakes. In fact, our paper is the first to present evidence that as stakes increase, rejection rates approach zero. JEL: C72, C78, C91

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Tài liệu tham khảo

Andersen Steffen, 2011, American Economic Review. http://www.aeaweb.org/articles. php?doi=10.1257/aer., 101, 3427, 10.1257/aer.101.7.3427

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American Economic Review

Tập 101 Số 7

3427-3439

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