Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities

Mathematical Social Sciences - Tập 60 - Trang 154-159 - 2010
Ayşe Mumcu1, Ismail Saglam2
1Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Bebek 34342, Istanbul, Turkey
2Department of Economics, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Sogutozu Cad. No:43, Sogutozu, 06560, Ankara, Turkey

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