Sorting and communication in weak-link group contests

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization - Tập 152 - Trang 64-80 - 2018
Philip Brookins1,2, John P. Lightle3, Dmitry Ryvkin4
1Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
2Visiting Fellow, Laboratory for Innovation Science at Harvard and Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, 1737 Cambridge St., Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
3Department of Economics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000, USA
4Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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