Giao tiếp xã hội và sự phân biệt: một thí nghiệm video

Experimental Economics - Tập 15 - Trang 398-417 - 2011
Ben Greiner1, Werner Güth2, Ro’i Zultan3
1School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
2Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany
3Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel

Tóm tắt

Chúng tôi báo cáo về một thí nghiệm sử dụng công nghệ video để nghiên cứu ảnh hưởng của giao tiếp đối với các khoản quyên góp và sự phân biệt giữa những người nhận tiềm năng. Thiết kế thí nghiệm loại bỏ các yếu tố chiến lược bằng cách cho phép hai người nhận giao tiếp đơn phương với một nhà tài trợ ẩn danh trước khi người này quyết định về các khoản quà của mình. Thông qua việc sử dụng ba thiết lập giao tiếp (không có, âm thanh và hình ảnh - âm thanh), chúng tôi phân tích các tác động xã hội thuần túy của giao tiếp. Một kênh video im lặng dẫn đến sự phân biệt giữa những người nhận tiềm năng dựa trên việc hình thành ấn tượng, nhưng không ảnh hưởng đến mức độ quyên góp trung bình. Khi kênh âm thanh được thêm vào, mức quyên góp trung bình tăng lên. Các quá trình xã hội được kích hoạt bởi các kênh hình ảnh và âm thanh là không đồng nhất và đặc trưng cho người giao tiếp nhưng không mang tính ngẫu nhiên.

Từ khóa

#giao tiếp xã hội #phân biệt #quyên góp #thí nghiệm video #công nghệ video

Tài liệu tham khảo

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