Simulation Analysis for Network Formulation

Computational Economics - Tập 43 Số 3 - Trang 371-394 - 2014
Hayashida, Tomohiro1, Nishizaki, Ichiro1, Kambara, Rika1
1Department of Artificial Complex Systems Engineering, Graduate School of Engineering, Hiroshima University, Higashi-hiroshima, Japan

Tóm tắt

In their model of network formation, Berninghaus et al. (Exp Econ 9:237–251, 2006; J Evol Econ 17:317–347, 2007) showed that a periphery-sponsored star network is a strict Nash equilibrium. To examine the validity of their result, they also performed a laboratory experiment with human subjects, and they found that a periphery-sponsored star network can be formed, but when broken down, a different star network forms. In this paper, after considering some factors explaining this phenomenon, we develop a simulation system involving these factors with artificial autonomous agents. Through simulations using this system, we try to explain the behavior of human subjects in the network formation experiment, i.e., the fact that a strict Nash equilibrium periphery-sponsored star network is broken down and a different periphery-sponsored star network is formed.

Tài liệu tham khảo

citation_journal_title=Games and Economic Behavior; citation_title=Auctions with artificial adaptive agents; citation_author=J Andreoni, JH Miller; citation_volume=10; citation_publication_date=1995; citation_pages=39-64; citation_doi=10.1006/game.1995.1024; citation_id=CR1 Aumann, R. J. & Myerson, R. B. (1988). Endogenous formation of links between players and coalitions: An application of the shapley value. In A. Roth (Ed.), The shapley value. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Axelrod, R. (1987). The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. In L. Davis (Ed.), Genetic algorithms and simulated annealing (pp. 32–41). London: Pitman. Axelrod, R. (1997). Advancing the art of simulation in the social sciences. In R. Conte, R. Hegselmann, & R. Terna (Eds.), Simulating social phenomena (pp. 21–40). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. citation_journal_title=Econometrica; citation_title=A non-cooperative model of network formation; citation_author=V Bala, S Goyal; citation_volume=68; citation_publication_date=2000; citation_pages=1181-1229; citation_doi=10.1111/1468-0262.00155; citation_id=CR5 Banerje, B. & Sen, S. (2002). Selecting parters. In S. Parsons, P. Gmytrasiewicz & M. Wooldridge (Eds.), Game theory and decision theory in agent-based systems (pp. 27–42). Boston/Dordrecht/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. citation_journal_title=Experimental Economics; citation_title=A network experiment in continuous time: The influence of link costs; citation_author=SK Berninghaus, KM Ehrhart, M Ott; citation_volume=9; citation_publication_date=2006; citation_pages=237-251; citation_doi=10.1007/s10683-006-9125-1; citation_id=CR7 citation_journal_title=Journal of Evolutionary Economics; citation_title=Evolution of networks–an experimental analysis; citation_author=SK Berninghaus, KM Ehrhart, M Ott, B Vogt; citation_volume=17; citation_publication_date=2007; citation_pages=317-347; citation_doi=10.1007/s00191-006-0050-4; citation_id=CR8 citation_journal_title=American Economic Review; citation_title=A comparative model of bargaining: Theory and evidence; citation_author=GE Bolton; citation_volume=81; citation_publication_date=1991; citation_pages=1096-1136; citation_id=CR9 citation_journal_title=American Economic Review; citation_title=ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition; citation_author=GE Bolton, A Ockenfels; citation_volume=90; citation_publication_date=2000; citation_pages=166-193; citation_doi=10.1257/aer.90.1.166; citation_id=CR10 citation_journal_title=Bell Journal of Economics; citation_title=A combinatiorial optimization model for transmission of job information through contact networks; citation_author=S Boorman; citation_volume=6; citation_publication_date=1975; citation_pages=216-249; citation_doi=10.2307/3003223; citation_id=CR11 citation_title=Dynamic social network modeling and analysis: Workshop summary and papers; citation_publication_date=2003; citation_id=CR12; citation_author=RL Breiger; citation_author=KM Carley; citation_author=PE Pattison; citation_publisher=The National Academies Press citation_journal_title=Journal of Public Economics; citation_title=Principles of network development and evolution: An experimental study; citation_author=S Callander, CR Plott; citation_volume=89; citation_publication_date=2005; citation_pages=1469-1495; citation_doi=10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.009; citation_id=CR13 citation_journal_title=IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks; citation_title=Evolving neural networks to play checkers without expert knowledge; citation_author=K Chellapilla, DB Fogel; citation_volume=10; citation_publication_date=1999; citation_pages=1382-1391; citation_doi=10.1109/72.809083; citation_id=CR14 citation_title=Simulating social phenomena; citation_publication_date=1997; citation_id=CR15; citation_author=R Conte; citation_author=R Hegselmann; citation_author=R Terna; citation_publisher=Springer-Verlag citation_journal_title=Game and Economic Behavior; citation_title=Ultimatum bargaining behavior in Israel, Japan, Slovenia, and the United States: A social utility analysis; citation_author=M Costa-Gomes, KG Zauner; citation_volume=34; citation_publication_date=2001; citation_pages=238-269; citation_doi=10.1006/game.2000.0805; citation_id=CR16 citation_journal_title=Review of Economic Design; citation_title=Network formation with sequential demands; citation_author=S Currarini, M Morelli; citation_volume=5; citation_publication_date=2000; citation_pages=229-250; citation_doi=10.1007/PL00013689; citation_id=CR17 citation_journal_title=Review Economic Design; citation_title=Link bidding in laboratory networks; citation_author=C Deck, C Johnson; citation_volume=8; citation_publication_date=2004; citation_pages=359-372; citation_doi=10.1007/s10058-003-0108-9; citation_id=CR18 citation_title=Evolution of social networks; citation_publication_date=1997; citation_id=CR19; citation_author=P Doreian; citation_author=F Stokman; citation_publisher=Gordon and Breach Publishers Dorsey, R.E., Johnson, J.D. & van Boening, M. V. (1994). The use of artificial neural networks for estimation of decision surfaces in first price sealed bid auctions. In W. W. Cooper, & A. B. Whinston (Eds.), New direction in computational economics (pp. 19–40). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing. Downing, T. E., Moss, S. & Pahl-Wostl C. (2001). Understanding climate policy using participatory agent-based social simulation. In S. Moss & P. Davidsson (Eds.), Multi-agent based simulation (pp. 198–213). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. citation_title=Glowing artificial societies; citation_publication_date=1996; citation_id=CR22; citation_author=JM Epstein; citation_author=R Axtell; citation_publisher=Brookings Institution Press citation_journal_title=Games and Economic Behavior; citation_title=Coodination, “magic”, and reinforcement learning in a market entry game; citation_author=I Erev, A Rapoport; citation_volume=23; citation_publication_date=1998; citation_pages=146-175; citation_doi=10.1006/game.1997.0619; citation_id=CR23 citation_journal_title=American Economic Review; citation_title=Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria; citation_author=I Erev, AE Roth; citation_volume=88; citation_publication_date=1998; citation_pages=848-881; citation_id=CR24 citation_journal_title=Review of Economic Design; citation_title=Network formation with sequential demands; citation_author=A Falk, M Kosfeld; citation_volume=5; citation_publication_date=2000; citation_pages=229-250; citation_doi=10.1007/PL00013689; citation_id=CR25 citation_journal_title=Quarterly Journal Economics; citation_title=A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation; citation_author=E Fehr, KM Schmidt; citation_volume=114; citation_publication_date=1999; citation_pages=817-868; citation_doi=10.1162/003355399556151; citation_id=CR26 citation_journal_title=Social Forces; citation_title=Horizons of observability and limits of informal control in organizations; citation_author=NE Friedkin; citation_volume=62; citation_publication_date=1983; citation_pages=54-77; citation_id=CR27 citation_title=Getting a job: A study of contacts and careers; citation_publication_date=1995; citation_id=CR28; citation_author=M Granovetter; citation_publisher=University of Chicago Press citation_journal_title=Games and Economic Behavior; citation_title=In search of stars: Networkformation among heterogeneous agents; citation_author=JK Goeree, A Riedl, A Ule; citation_volume=67; citation_publication_date=2008; citation_pages=445-466; citation_doi=10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.005; citation_id=CR29 citation_title=Connections: An introduction to the economics of networks; citation_publication_date=2007; citation_id=CR30; citation_author=S Goyal; citation_publisher=Princeton University Press citation_journal_title=Review of Economics Studies; citation_title=The economics of hubs: The case of monopoly; citation_author=K Hendricks, M Piccione, G Tan; citation_volume=62; citation_publication_date=1995; citation_pages=83-99; citation_doi=10.2307/2297842; citation_id=CR31 citation_journal_title=American Economic Review; citation_title=Adaptive intelligent agents in economic theory; citation_author=JH Holland, JH Miller; citation_volume=81; citation_publication_date=1991; citation_pages=365-370; citation_id=CR32 citation_title=A survey of models of network formation. Stability and efficiency; citation_inbook_title=Group formation in economics: Networks, clubs and coalitions; citation_publication_date=2005; citation_pages=11-57; citation_id=CR33; citation_author=MO Jackson; citation_publisher=Cambridge University Press citation_journal_title=Journal of Economic Theory; citation_title=A strategic model of social and economic networks; citation_author=MO Jackson, A Wolinsky; citation_volume=71; citation_publication_date=1996; citation_pages=44-74; citation_doi=10.1006/jeth.1996.0108; citation_id=CR34 citation_journal_title=Journal of Economic Theory; citation_title=Barriers to trade and disadvantageous middlemen: Nonmonotonicity of the core; citation_author=E Kalai, A Postlewaite, G Roberts; citation_volume=19; citation_publication_date=1978; citation_pages=200-209; citation_doi=10.1016/0022-0531(78)90065-0; citation_id=CR35 citation_journal_title=Bell Journal of Economics; citation_title=The internal organization of the firm and the shape of averagecosts; citation_author=M Keren, D Levhari; citation_volume=14; citation_publication_date=1983; citation_pages=474-486; citation_doi=10.2307/3003648; citation_id=CR36 citation_journal_title=International Journal of Game Theory; citation_title=Neural nets in a group decision process; citation_author=M Leshno, D Moller, P Ein-Dor; citation_volume=31; citation_publication_date=2002; citation_pages=447-467; citation_doi=10.1007/s001820300130; citation_id=CR37 citation_title=Individual choice behavior; citation_publication_date=1959; citation_id=CR38; citation_author=D Luce; citation_publisher=Wiley citation_journal_title=Games and Economic Behavior; citation_title=Quantal response equilibria for normal form games; citation_author=RD McKelvey, TR Palfrey; citation_volume=10; citation_publication_date=1995; citation_pages=6-38; citation_doi=10.1006/game.1995.1023; citation_id=CR39 citation_journal_title=American Economic Review; citation_title=Social networks and labor market outcomes: Toward an economic analysis; citation_author=J Montgomery; citation_volume=81; citation_publication_date=1991; citation_pages=1408-1418; citation_id=CR40 citation_title=Multi-agent-based simulation; citation_publication_date=2001; citation_id=CR41; citation_author=S Moss; citation_author=P Davidsson; citation_publisher=Springer-Verlag citation_journal_title=Journal of Economic Theory; citation_title=Subscription mechanisms for network formation; citation_author=S Mutuswami, E Winter; citation_volume=106; citation_publication_date=2002; citation_pages=242-264; citation_doi=10.1006/jeth.2001.2920; citation_id=CR42 citation_journal_title=Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology; citation_title=A general framework of agent-based simulation for analyzing behavior of players in games; citation_author=I Nishizaki; citation_volume=2007; citation_issue=4; citation_publication_date=2007; citation_pages=28-35; citation_id=CR43 citation_journal_title=Computational Economics; citation_title=Simulation analysis using multi-agent systems for social norms; citation_author=I Nishizaki, H Katagiri, T Oyama; citation_volume=34; citation_publication_date=2009; citation_pages=37-65; citation_doi=10.1007/s10614-009-9170-x; citation_id=CR44 citation_journal_title=Applied Artificial Intelligence; citation_title=Lotteries as a means of financing for preservation of the global commons and agent-based simulation analysis; citation_author=I Nishizaki, Y Ueda, T Sasaki; citation_volume=19; citation_publication_date=2005; citation_pages=721-741; citation_doi=10.1080/08839510500191828; citation_id=CR45 citation_journal_title=Neurocomputing; citation_title=Evolution of reinforcement learning in foraging bees: A simple explanation for risk averse behavior; citation_author=Y Niv, D Joel, I Meilijson, E Ruppin; citation_volume=44–46; citation_publication_date=2002; citation_pages=951-956; citation_doi=10.1016/S0925-2312(02)00496-4; citation_id=CR46 citation_journal_title=Games and Economic Behavior; citation_title=Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study; citation_author=J Ochs; citation_volume=10; citation_publication_date=1995; citation_pages=202-217; citation_doi=10.1006/game.1995.1030; citation_id=CR47 citation_title=Game theory and decision theory in agent-based systems; citation_publication_date=2002; citation_id=CR48; citation_author=S Parsons; citation_author=P Gmytrasiewicz; citation_author=M Wooldridge; citation_publisher=Kluwer Academic Publishers citation_journal_title=Games and Economic Behavior; citation_title=Coordination and learning behavior in large groups with asymmetric players; citation_author=A Rapoport, DA Seale, E Winter; citation_volume=39; citation_publication_date=2002; citation_pages=111-136; citation_doi=10.1006/game.2001.0885; citation_id=CR49 citation_journal_title=Games and Economic Behavior; citation_title=Learning in extensive form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term; citation_author=AE Roth, I Erev; citation_volume=8; citation_publication_date=1995; citation_pages=163-212; citation_doi=10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80020-X; citation_id=CR50 citation_title=Two sided matching. Econometric Society Monographs 18; citation_publication_date=1989; citation_id=CR51; citation_author=A Roth; citation_author=M Sotomayor; citation_publisher=Cambridge University Press Schillo, M., Fischer, K., & Klein, C. T. (2000). The micro-macro link in DAI and sociology. In S. Moss & P. Davidsson (Eds.), Multi-agent-based simulation (pp. 133–148). Berlin: Springer. Sharkey, W. (1993). Network models in economics. In M. O. Ball et al. (Eds.), The handbook of operations research and management science. Amsterdam. citation_title=Multi-agent-based simulation II; citation_publication_date=2003; citation_id=CR54; citation_author=JS Sichman; citation_author=F Bousquet; citation_author=P Davidsson; citation_publisher=Springer-Verlag Starr, R. & Stinchcombe, M., (1992). An economic analysis of the hub and spoke system. UC San Diego: Mimeo. citation_journal_title=Special Issue of Journal of Mathematical Sociology; citation_title=The evolution of social networks, part II; citation_author=F. N. Stokman, P. Doreian; citation_volume=25; citation_publication_date=2001; citation_pages=1-4; citation_id=CR56 citation_journal_title=Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes; citation_title=Coordination in market entry games with symmetric players; citation_author=JA Sundali, A Rapoport, DA Seale; citation_volume=64; citation_publication_date=1995; citation_pages=203-218; citation_doi=10.1006/obhd.1995.1100; citation_id=CR57 citation_title=Reinforcement learning: An introduction; citation_publication_date=1998; citation_id=CR58; citation_author=RS Sutton; citation_author=AG Barto; citation_publisher=MIT Press