Nội dung được dịch bởi AI, chỉ mang tính chất tham khảo
Sự đơn giản, giả thuyết một lần và giải thích động lực học cổ sinh
Tóm tắt
Các nhà cổ sinh vật học (và những nhà khoa học lịch sử khác) thường đưa ra các câu chuyện đơn giản để giải thích những sự kiện phức tạp và tùy thuộc vào ngữ cảnh. Những câu chuyện này đôi khi là các ‘giả thuyết một lần’ được coi là loại trừ lẫn nhau với những giải thích khả thi khác về sự kiện mục tiêu, và do đó được mở rộng để bao quát tối đa về sự kiện đó. Tôi lập luận rằng sự ưu tiên tạm thời cho những giả thuyết như vậy cung cấp hai loại cấu trúc hỗ trợ có hiệu quả. Thứ nhất, chúng tạo ra ‘các yếu tố khác biệt giả thuyết’: các giả thuyết một lần làm nổi bật và cách ly các sự phụ thuộc có thể theo dõi được về mặt thực nghiệm giữa các biến. Thứ hai, việc điều tra các yếu tố khác biệt giả thuyết cung cấp tài nguyên giải thích, những ‘nguyên liệu thô’ để xây dựng những giải thích phức tạp hơn - và có khả năng đầy đủ hơn. Do đó, sự ưu tiên tạm thời cho những giả thuyết đơn giản, một lần trong khoa học lịch sử, là hợp lý một cách có thể chấp nhận được trên cơ sở gián tiếp - chiến lược. Lập luận của tôi được thực hiện liên quan đến những phát triển gần đây về sự tuyệt chủng K–Pg.
Từ khóa
#giả thuyết một lần #cổ sinh vật học #giải thích khoa học #sự tuyệt chủng K–PgTài liệu tham khảo
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