Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions

Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Tập 63 Số 1 - Trang 21-41 - 2001
Joan Feigenbaum1, Christos H. Papadimitriou2, Scott Shenker3
1Computer Science Department, Yale University, P.O. Box 208285, New Haven, Connecticut, 06520-8285, f1E-mail: [email protected]#TAB#
2Computer Science Division, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, California, 94720, f2E-mail: [email protected]#TAB#
3ACIRI, International Computer Science Institute, 1947 Center Street, Suite 600, Berkeley, California, 94704-1198, f3E-mail: [email protected]#TAB#

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