Sharing, Discounting, and Selfishness: A Japanese-American Comparison

The Psychological Record - Tập 61 - Trang 59-75 - 2017
Masato Ito1, Daisuke Saeki1, Leonard Green2
1Department of Psychology, Faculty of Literature, Osaka City University, Sumiyoshiku, Osaka, Japan
2Washington University USA

Tóm tắt

Social discounting rates were compared between Japanese and American college students. In a series of psychophysical questionnaire tasks, participants chose between a hypothetical unshared monetary reward and a hypothetical monetary reward to be shared with other people (relatives or strangers), to determine amounts of the unshared reward subjectively equivalent to the shared reward. The participants also chose between sharing and not-sharing options in a one-shot dilemma game. Discount rates estimated by a hyperbolic function were higher among the Japanese students than among the American students. Moreover, the discount rates obtained in the relative condition were lower than in the stranger condition. In addition, participants who chose the sharing option in the dilemma situation showed lower discount rates. These results suggest that discount rates reflect a cultural difference as well as a degree of “selfishness.”

Tài liệu tham khảo

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